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What Price Style? The Fabric-Advisory
Function of the Drygoods Commission
Merchant, 1850-1880
C Using data from nineteenth-century New England, Dr. Siegenthaler
isolates a value for the most important function which drygoods market-
ing agencies performed for the mills they represented. His conclusions
cast new light on the key role played by fashion considerations in decision
making within the textile industry.
It is well known that mid-nineteenth-century New England
textile mills paid a good deal of money for the services of the dry-
goods commission houses which marketed their products. A large
cotton mill with a wholesale value of output of $1,000,000 per year
spent at least $15,000 per year on commissions. In comparison, the
same corporation paid its top manager, the treasurer, a yearly salary
of $5,000 to $7,000 for general supervision of operations and finance,
for buying stock, and for dealing with labor problems; its top tech-
nician, the mill superintendent, was paid a salary of less than $5,000
per year to supervise production.1
The relative share of total expenditures on managerial services
which went to the marketing agency was thus large and indicates
that the latter furnished a valuable bundle of relatively scarce ser-
vices. It is the object of this paper to show that, indeed, the bundle
of services provided by the marketing agency was crucial to the
success of the mill; and to show that the one service of outstanding
importance was the giving of advice on the choice of fabrics to be
produced.
Choice of fabrics to be produced was a decision of increasing
Business History Review, Vol. XLI, No. 1 (Spring, 1967). © The President and Fellows
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1
 For the commission payments see, e.g., Report of Mr. William Sturgis' Committee to
Twenty-eight Manufacturing Companies (Boston, 1852), Appendix. For salaries: John S.
Ewing and Nancy P. Norton, Broadlooms and Businessmen: A History of the Bigelow-San-ford Carpet Company (Cambridge, Mass., 1955), 75, 107; James C. Ayer, Some of the
Usages and Abuses in the Management of Our Manufacturing Corporations (Lowell, Mass.,
1863), 13; Memorandum of Certain Commissions & Salaries Paid by Manuf' Co's, August
1, 1848, Amos A. Lawrence Papers (Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston).
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importance in the textile industry, from the middle of the nineteenth
century to the 1880's. The spread of technical knowledge and skill
and easier access to the technical equipment with the development
of a textile-machinery industry led to increasing competitive pres-
sure in the 1840's. At the same time, changes in demand, induced
by both economic and sociological developments related to increas-
ing per capita income, increasing social mobility, and urbanization,
opened opportunities to escape competitive pressures by securing,
at least for a short period of time, some profitable business in re-
sponse to some peculiar new taste.
Both the woolen and cotton industries reflected these trends;
but the latter less so. Woolen goods were of greater potential
variety and combination. The bulk of output in the cotton industry
consisted of quite standard goods, but the share of output repre-
sented by style conscious printed cotton fabrics was growing and by
1870 accounted for a considerable portion of total output.2
There was no organized fashion market, no seasonal openings
revealing dominant trends and guiding the production lines of many
mills into the same direction. There was, however, a general will-
ingness on the part of buyers to buy something new and eagerness
on the part of manufacturers to remain ahead of competitors by
meeting that desire with an almost uninterrupted flow of new
designs.
In 1850, for example, the Cocheco Manufacturing Co. introduced
new cotton-print styles throughout the year regardless of the sea-
sonal concentration of sales: two new styles in September; six in
July; and more than six in all other months with a high of thirteen
in October.3 At the end of our period, cotton-print seller Amory A.
Lawrence, of Lawrence & Co., observed, "to be successful we must
be on the alert all the time and constantly making new brands and
kind; the old 64 x 64 print seems to be about as dead a piece of
merchandise now as there is: had we not gotten largely off into other
things I do not know where our mills would have been." 4
2
 Arthur H. Cole, The American Wool Manufacture (2 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1926),
I, 297-98. The total yardage of cotton cloth produced in the U.S. according to the Census
of 1870 was 1,064,000,000, table cloth not included, the yardage of cotton prints and
delaines was 482,000,000. We include in the category of cotton fabrics requiring frequent
adjustments in style and color 35,000,000 yds. of lawns and fine muslins and 39,000,000
yds. of ginghams and checks, so that our discussion applies to roughly one-half of cotton
cloth sold to the trade. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Ninth Census of the United States, III,
Statistics of the Wealth and Industry of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1872), 596,
597, 621.
3
 Invoices of prints sent by Cocheco Mfg. Co. to Mason & Lawrence, 1850, Mason &
Lawrence Papers (Mason & Lawrence, 1843-1859; Mason, Lawrence & Co., 1859-1861;
Lawrence & Co., 1861 and thereafter, in Baker Library, Harvard Graduate School of
Business Administration, Boston).
'Amory A. Lawrence to Amos A. Lawrence, undated [c. 1886], A. A. Lawrence Papers.
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It is also clear that in those lines of production where a single
producer contributed a substantial percentage of total output, the
sales volume of each producer at a given price could fluctuate con-
siderably (even in the absence of any changes in aggregate de-
mand) according to the sum of all competitors' decisions on output
quantities. Thus, the individual producer had to adjust his produc-
tion program not only to fashion trends but also to changes in his
individual sales opportunities caused by output decisions by his
competitors.
The drygoods commission merchant was the key as he largely
controlled the production programs of the mills.5 The manufacturer
had to know how to produce. The commission house, according to
a salesman who proved his knowledge, had to know "just what to
tell [the mills] . . . to make and what there is sure to be a demand
for." 6
Of course, the role of the marketing agency in developing the
production program of the mill varied from case to case. It ranged
from mere approval or rejection to creative leadership. Bagnall
reports cases at the two extremes of behavior.7 In the first instance,
the mill took the initiative for product innovation. Damon, a small
woolen manufacturer in Concord, Massachusetts, was advised by
his marketing agency to produce satinet, a fabric made of cotton
warp and woolen filling. When the business became unprofitable,
Damon himself decided to put part of his machinery on woolen
flannels; again without much success. In both fields he met strong
competition. He then combined properties of each of his fabrics
and brought out something completely new: a cotton-wool fabric
with a flannel finish, the Domet Flannel. Damon's marketing agency
merely examined the result, anticipated its success, encouraged its
production, and introduced it to the trade.
In the second case, the .marketing agency took the lead. The
manufacturer was ready to enter flannel production but his com-
mission house was already selling flannels produced by a competing
5
 Caroline F. Ware, The Early New England Cotton Manufacture: A Study in Industrial
Beginnings (Boston, 1931), 184; Fred M. Jones, "The Development of Marketing Channels
in the United States to 1920," in Richard M. Clewett (ed.), Marketing Channels for Manu-factured Products (Homewood, 111., 1954), 26; Evelyn H. Knowlton, Pepperell's Progress:
History of a Cotton Textile Company, 1844-1945 (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), 81, 82; Joseph
Berger (ed. ) , Memoin of a Corporation: The Story of Mary and Mack and Pacific Mills
(Boston, 1950), 16.
"Henry A. Page to Moses T. Stevens, Nov. 25, 1870, Stevens Papers (business records
of the woolen mills of Nathaniel Stevens, North Andover, 1786-1865, and his successors,
in the Merrimack Valley Textile Museum, North Andover, Mass.).
' William R. Bagnall, "Sketches of Manufacturing Establishments in New York City and
of Textile Establishments in the Eastern States," edited by Victor S. Clark (unpublished
materials, 4 vols., 1908, in Baker Library, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administra-
tion, Boston), II, 1098-1101, 1170-71.
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mill. To avoid a market clash between his clients, the agent sug-
gested a slight modification in the newcomer's fabric (an increase
in the number of picks to the inch). The manufacturer took the
advice and the new fabric sold well — notably under the marketing
agency's name (as true creator of the new fabric) and not under
the mill's brand. Whether or not the new fabric was actually created
by the marketing agency, the decision to produce depended upon
its advice, because only the marketing agency was in touch with
the trade and in a position to judge prospective sales opportunities.
THE HYPOTHESIS TO BE TESTED
If the success of a product could thus depend largely on the
judgment of the marketing agency, then the agency was entitled
to share in the benefits of success. This share should show up in the
price which a mill was willing to pay for advice on the choice of
fabrics and, indirectly, in the compensation the marketing agency
received for the whole bundle of services which it performed. Were
it possible to isolate the price of the advisory service, we would gain
one pecuniary measure for evaluating the choice of fabrics as a
variable in the success of textile firms during our period. We would
also gain further insight into the importance of those structural
elements in the textile industry which are related to choices of
fabric. We should not expect to arrive at an exact figure for the
price of the fabric-advisory service; rather, we intend to show that
its magnitude was considerable.
Isolation of the price of the fabric-advisory service requires sev-
eral steps. First, we must separate from the other costs and profits
of the commission house those we will call the normal costs. To this
end, we shall use Lawrence & Co. of Boston as our commission-
house example. These normal costs are meant to cover only those
spendings on human skills which were incurred by all commission
houses in providing three basic services common to them all. These
basic services include: first, the selling service proper, that is, bring-
ing the seller into contact with buyers and soliciting sales; second,
the bookkeeping service, that is, keeping track of all sales and
monetary transactions; and third, the transportation service, that is,
organizing and supervising the transit of goods from the mill to
the wholesale markets.
We will find that for large agencies, the normal costs of these basic
services were small compared, with other costs and profits. And,
since these large firms handled the bulk of total business, normal
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costs can thus be assumed to be small in the average; that is, small
for all commission houses as a group. It will also be suggested that
the performance of the basic services was not likely to yield con-
siderable rents or profits to the commission house.
In a second step, we shall look at the additional services per-
formed by most of the commission houses and at both the costs in-
curred and the rents and profits realized in their performance.
Specifically, we shall consider: credit service, that is, the security
against losses provided to the mill through the commission house's
expert knowledge of the credit standing of buyers; financial service;
and finally, the fabric-advisory service.
We shall find that these additional services could introduce a
monopolistic element into the marketing mechanism: by offering a
package of additional services different from that of a competitor,
a commission house could attach a mill to itself and influence the
mill's demand for its services, pushing up the price of this package
and/or gaining additional business. Even if the price were very
inflexible, the commission house could at least realize a benefit from
economies of scale involved in decreasing its average normal costs.
A mill's spendings on additional services, that is, its payments
above normal costs, could reflect any or all of three elements: first,
an outlay on a factor of production representing a change in the
basic services, for example, on a salaried employee with special
skills or on a partner working in a particular capacity; second,
additional elements of profit because of a marketing agency's ability
to exploit a factor of production or its temporary leading position
in the performance of a special service or mixture of services; third,
an element of rent accruing to an agent whose package of services
was no better than most but who provided his services at less cost
than could his average competitor.
We shall try to estimate the value each of these three elements
had for each of the distinguishable additional services — an estima-
tion which involves more judgment than measurement. These
values changed over time, because rent and profit elements changed,
or because the competitive price of a factor of production changed,
or because the need of a service changed. The package of addi-
tional services most likely to attract a mill and to bind it to the com-
mission house was not the same in 1850 as it was in 1880. The fabric-
advisory service, however, gained in relative importance throughout
the period.
In a third step, we shall again make use of the accounting data
of Lawrence & Co. in order to get more directly at the value of this
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crucial fabric-advisory service. This case study yields a figure for
the price one had to pay in the market for the special skills in-
volved in giving such advice.
Before entering upon this three-step argument, however, we
must resolve a preliminary problem: payments by a mill to its
marketing agency would not reflect the true value of the package
of basic and additional services provided by the agency if either
controlled the other through financial ties, collusive arrangements,
or other factors barring a free bargaining process.
WAS THE MARKET FOB SERVICES COMPETITIVE?
Our argument depends upon the assumptions that the drygoods
commission houses offered their services in a competitive market and
that the mills purchased these services under competitive conditions
as well. The first assumption may be questioned; the second ap-
pears to rest on safer ground, as follows.
A large number of textile mills was selling in a few wholesale
centers; for example, 304 woolen and 250 cotton producers in Maine,
New Hampshire, and Massachusetts alone were competing for the
services of commission houses by 1870.8 In spite of the collusive
disposition of the industry, actual agreement on selling terms was
apparently never reached between producers and marketers as
groups.9 Cases of mills controlling commission houses by owner-
ship were also exceptional.10
The number of competing marketers was also high — 74 houses
in Boston alone by 1870.11 There is fragmentary evidence of a
competitive spirit among established houses: Mason & Lawrence,
"Ninth Census of the United States, III, Statistics of the Wealth and Industry of the
United States, passim.9
 Collective bargaining took place between the commission house A. & A. Lawrence &
Co. and its mills when the latter in 1852 took steps for common action by twenty-eight
manufacturing companies to prevent A. & A. Lawrence from raising the rate of commissions.
The result of this attempt at mobilizing some countervailing power against the leading com-
mission house was a compromise between A. & A. Lawrence & Co. and the mills for which
it sold, but another commission house, Francis Skinner & Co., felt free to change its terms
at the same time without being bound by the Lawrence compromise. Knowlton, Pepperell's
Progress, 77-79.
10
 There were some early cases of direct selling. The partnership B. B. & R. Knight,
Providence, formed in 1852, managed by two brothers, one a merchant, the other a manu-
facturer, handled both production at its mills and marketing of the product to the trade;
there are other cases of this brotherly backward or forward integration. Bagnall, "Sketches
of Manufacturing Establishments," II, 1402-1431.
lx
 The number of seventy-four drygoods commission houses in Boston by 1870 includes
those firms which, according to Dockham's U. S. Cotton, Woolen, Silk, and Linen Manufac-
turers' Report and Directory, 1870-71 (Boston, 1870), were actually selling for textile
mills, i.e., not only those listed as commission merchants but also those appearing under
the title of a manufacturing firm as its selling agent, provided that they are reported on
by R. G. Dun & Co. for doing primarily a drygoods commission business. R. G. Dun & Co.,
credit reporting ledgers for Boston (Baker Library, Harvard Graduate School of Business
Administration, Boston).
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for example, was ready to undersell competitors by 1843; Henry A.
Page of Faulkner, Page & Co. tried to change a mill's allegiance by
1877.12 More important, however, newcomers' competition was
always effective: competition; from importers turning to a domestic
business or from retailers or jobbers changing over to a commission
business or combining the latter with wholesaling or retailing.13
The rise of new drygoods centers also offered alternatives to ex-
isting channels.14 Thus, concentration of business in the hands of
the leading houses was not particularly impressive: the mills for
which the eighteen leading Boston commission houses sold by 1870
represented 59 per cent of the total capital invested in the woolen
and cotton industries of Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachu-
setts.15 It does not appear, therefore, that the mills as a group were
tied to any exclusive group of commission houses. Yet mills may
have been (and partly were) individually controlled by their com-
mission houses through ownership.
Mercantile interests continued to be important in textile-mill
ownership throughout the nineteenth century.16 But did commis-
sion houses generally own the mills for which they sold? A com-
parison of the total amount of funds available to the Boston
commission houses for investment with the capital invested in the
mills they served reveals that the commission houses could hardly
have purchased a controlling interest in a majority of the mills,
much less actually have owned them.
Our estimation of total capital available to the commission
houses for investment is based on figures for the total "worth" of
seventy-four Boston houses as given in the credit-rating reports
of R. G. Dun & Co. for 1870. It is granted that estimation of this
"worth," that is, the total amount of capital at the risk of business
plus capital actually invested in the mercantile firm and the prop-
erty of the partners in whatever way it happened to be invested,
u
 Robert M. Mason to Amos A. Lawrence, March 9, 1843, A. A. Lawrence Papers; Henry
A. Page to Moses T. Stevens, April 12, 1877, Stevens Papers.
13
 Of 74 drygoods commission merchants doing business in Boston by 1870, 2 had
started out as jobbers, 3 as importers, 4 had combined jobbing and importing before turning
to a domestic commission business, 10 did a mixed business in 1870. R. G. Dun & Co.,
credit reporting ledgers for Boston.
« Fred M. Jones, Middlemen in the Domestic Trade of the United States, 1800-1860
(Urbana, 111., 1937), 15.
15
 The result is a lower limit for the actual figure. The amount of capital invested in
the mills for which each commission house sold has been calculated on the basis of capital
figures given for incorporated companies in Dockham's U. S. Textile Directory, 1870-71. We
are assuming that the capital reported by the ninth Census for the cotton and woolen indus-
tries of Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts approximates the capital actually invested
in all mills selling through Boston houses, in other words, that the capital represented by
those mills in those three states not selling through Boston commission houses is about equal
to the capital of mills from other states selling through Boston houses.
10Melvin T. Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United States (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 1912), 215.
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would have been difficult even on the basis of complete inside
information — which the credit-rating agency did not have. The
latter's figures were based largely on interviews, correspondence,
and guesswork. We take them only for a rough approximation of
the order of size.17
Dun's figures indicate a total commission-house "worth" of
$31,000,000. The capital requirements of a commission business
proper were small and this left the bulk of the total "worth" of a
commission house to be disposed of at will; for example, to be
invested in manufacturing property. We estimate (disregarding
for a moment the actual investment policies of the commission
houses) that roughly $30,000,000 of the $31,000,000 "worth" could
have been available for the purchase o£ a controlling interest in
the mills for which the commission houses sold. This amount com-
pares with the $97,000,000 capitalization attributed to all woolen
and cotton mills in Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts (the
mills predominantly selling through Boston) by the U. S. Census
of 1870.
Thus, we suggest that the Boston commission houses had the
potential to acquire a majority equity in somewhat less than 60 per
cent of the mills for which they sold. There is no reason, of course,
to believe that the commission houses actually locked up all their
disposable funds in the mills. We know that the capital of some com-
mission-house partners was invested in a broad variety of property:
Amos A. Lawrence, for example, held factory stock at a market
value of $166,700 in 1857 as well as $114,500 worth of real estate;
the senior partner of George C. Richardson & Co. was said to be a
large real estate owner; Joseph Nickerson & Co. made money in
railroad stock by 1878.18
Some of the commission houses were both marketers and bank-
ers.19 Many enjoyed considerable liquidity and were able to
make loans to the mills. The more important advances from the
commission house to the mill came to be, the less likely was it for
commission houses to have their funds invested in mill stock.20 On
17
 R. G. Dun & Co., credit reporting ledgers for Boston. For a polemic analysis of the
creditability of the agency's figures see Thomas F. Meagher, The Commercial Agency
"System" of the United States and Canada Exposed (New York, 1876).
18
 Property of Amos A. Lawrence, 1857, A. A. Lawrence Papers; R. G. Dun & Co.,
credit reporting ledgers for Boston, vol. 4, p. 334 (vol. 73 of Massachusetts series), February
26, 1879 (short citation used hereafter: Dun & Co., Boston: 4.334(73), 2-26-79; Dun &
Co., Boston: 2.886(70), 11-20-78.
19
 Dun & Co., Boston: 1.103(67), 4-19-56 (Mudge, Sawyer & Co.); 2.495(69), 11-30-
57 (Nevins&Co.).
20
 William H. Hilliger, James Talcott: Merchant and his Time (New York, 1937), Ewing
and Norton, Broadlooms, 28, 54, 76, 78, 80, 94. Copeland, Cotton Manufacturing, 210,
212, 215.
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TABLE 1
AVERAGE MONTHLY PAYMENTS OF THE COCHECO MANUFACTURING C O .
TO LAWRENCE & Co. ON COMMISSIONS AND SALARIES
OF EMPLOYEES, 1849-1883
Year
1849
1850
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
A
($)
1,154
1,026
1,024
1,355
1,358
1,236
1,353
1,239
929
1,335
1,010
967
626
711
399
1,470
1,535
2,360
2,470
2,060
2,180
2,840
3,660
4,230
4,720
4,370
3,940
3,615
3,305
2,620
3,375
4,150
3,480
3,480
3,425
B
(A%G)
84
86
81
82
78
77
77
75
72
78
76
73
64
72
60
83
81
86
86
83
84
87
90
92
92
91
89
88
87
83
86
87
90
91
94
c
($)
132
84
140
210
269
216
231
201
162
244
222
257
242
196
184
194
222
228
201
182
164
155
134
142
188
225
225
192
167
150
150
167
—
D
<*)
89
81
95
87
108
156
181
207
192
133
102
94
106
86
86
110
149
161
188
231
235
259
255
231
203
186
282
324
308
388
'411
458
392
355
235
E F
(C + D)(E%G)
221
165
235
297
377
372
412
408
354
377
324
351
348
282
270
304
371
389
389
413
399
414
389
373
391
411
507
516
475
-538
561
625
392
355
235
16
14
19
18
22
23
23
25
28
22
24
27
36
28
40
17
19
14
14
17
16
13
10
8
8
9
11
12
13
17
14
13
10
9
6
G
(A+E)
1,375
1,191
1,259
1,652
1,735
1,608
1,765
1,647
1,283
1,712
1,334
1,318
974
993
669
1,774
1,906
2,749
2,859
2,473
2,579
3,254
4,049
4,603
5,111
4,781
4,447
4,131
3,780
3,158
3,936
4,775
3,872
3,835
3,660
H I I
($l,000)(E%H)(G%H)
76
72
65
85
89
77
85
83
61
91
81
77
50
57
32
118
123
189
198
165
174
190
209
244
271
250
225
206
189
150
194
237
199
200
196
0.29
0.23
0.36
0.35
0.42
0.48
0.49
0.49
0.58
0.41
0.40
0.45
0.70
0.50
0.85
0.26
0.30
0.21
0.20
0.25
0.23
0.22
0.19
0.15
0.14
0.16
0.23
0.25
0.25
0.36
0.29
0.26
(0.20)
(0.18)
(0.12)
1.81
1.67
1.94
1.95
1.95
2.08
2.09
1.99
2.09
1.88
1.66
1.71
1.95
1.75
2.10
1.51
1.55
1.45
1.44
1.50
1.48
1.71
1.94
1.88
1.88
1.91
1.98
2.00
2.00
2.10
2.02
2.02
1.95
1.92
1.87
A. Average monthly regular commissions going to partners of Lawrence & Co.
C. Average monthly commissions going to sub-agent in New York (after May 31, 1859,
part of salary of employee in New York).
of salary of employee in New York).
D. Average monthly share of Cocheco Manufacturing Co. in salaries paid to employees by
Lawrence & Co. in addition to C.
H. Average monthly gross wholesale value of sales.
For additional notes see Appendix.
44 BUSINESS HISTORY REVIEW
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.2307/3112420
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 10 Jul 2017 at 16:17:47, subject to the
the whole, then, we argue that the number of mills free from con-
trol by commission-house ownership was sufficient for the services
of the commission houses to have a competitive market price. This
leaves open the possibility of cases, of course, in which, on the basis
of control through ownership, selling terms may have deviated from
a competitive level.
THE VALUE OF Basic Services
Table 1 gives a series of prices for the basic services provided
by Mason & Lawrence (later Lawrence & Co.) in selling the prod-
ucts of the Cocheco Manufacturing Co., a cotton-print mill, from
1849 to 1883. Column I represents the ratio between the mill's pay-
ments for the selling service (column E) and the wholesale value
of the product handled by the commission house (column H). The
figures give a monthly average for each commercial year.
Payments by the mill for the selling service included two com-
ponents. First, they include part of the amount which the mill
contributed to the general expenses of the commission house — pay-
ments on salaries, store rent, taxes, stationery, and so on. The pro-
portion of total general expenses represented by salaries was
stable: 53 per cent on the average for the two years 1849-1850; 47
per cent, 1859-1860 and 1869-1870; and 56 per cent, 1879-1880.21
We have used these proportions in calculating the increment of
general expenses represented by salaries of employees (column D).
Second, the selling service payments contain commissions paid by
the mill to a sub-agent or, after May 31, 1859, to an employee of
the commission house, who was stationed in New York (column C).
We propose to combine the series of payments to salaried em-
ployees (D) and the series of payments to sub-agents (C) into a
series representing the cost of the selling service as a whole (column
E). We assume that this service was performed by these employees
and sub-agents with no one else adding much to its performance.
Is this a valid assumption? How was it in reality? We are well
informed on the activities of Lawrence & Co.'s sub-agents through
their correspondence with the Boston office during the year 1850.
Where our information is not sufficient as far as the New York sub-
agent, R. H. Snow, is concerned, we can make use of the evidence
available for his Philadelphia colleague, W. E. Pratt, who worked
in the same capacity.
21
 Calculated on the basis of entries in the ledgers and waste books of Mason & Lawrence
and Lawrence & Co. respectively, Mason & Lawrence Papers.
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The sub-agents did provide the selling service in their respective
markets. Nobody was there to assist them directly in the promotion
of sales. In addition, they helped the home office perform other
than basic services. They informed Mason & Lawrence on price
trends, quoting competing offers, reported on the sales success of
competitors, and thus assisted the Boston office in making price
decisions for distant markets.22 They gave their judgment on trends
in the development of aggregate demand or on changes in buyers'
preferences for particular fabrics M and on their taste for particular
colors or designs.24 The Philadelphia sub-agent was personally in-
volved on a few occasions in getting up new styles in prints and he
decided on one occasion on the proportion in which different colors
were to be printed.25 Thus, sub-agents helped the commission house
to reach decisions on the choice of fabrics. They also investigated
the credit standing of buyers, soliciting information on which Mason
& Lawrence would be able to base their conclusions.26 This leaves
us with the impression that the sub-agents' earnings (column C)
fully covered the value of their salesmanship and may have included
an undeterminable value of awareness of a market situation and
of future trends and a knowledge of the credit standing of buyers.
What the mill paid on salaried employees (column D) was not
related to neatly defined jobs and does not represent a price for
a particular service. Instead of asking what activities it could have
covered, we ask to what extent it would have covered the costs of
selling the goods not sold by sub-agents outside of Boston? The
gross wholesale value of sales effected through the Boston office
amounted to 71 per cent of the corresponding value of sales effected
in New York by the sub-agent during the years 1850-1855.27 Pay-
ments to salaried employees in Boston for these years were 62 per
cent of commissions paid to the New York sub-agent. Would an
amount equal to 62 per cent of the New York sub-agent's commis-
22
 R. H. Snow to Mason & Lawrence, July 19, 24, 25, 26, August 7, 8, September 10,
13, October 5, 9, 30, 18S0, W. E. Pratt to Mason & Lawrence, January 11, February 17,
April 4, July 3, October 17, 1850, Mason & Lawrence Papers.
23
 Snow to Mason & Lawrence, September 13, 1850, Pratt to Mason & Lawrence, January
5, 15, 22, 31, February 19, March 16, 18, April 11, October 1, November 4, 1850, Mason
& Lawrence Papers.
24
 Snow to Mason & Lawrence, October 5, 1850, Pratt to Mason & Lawrence, January
18, 23, February 6, 7, 8, 11, March 20, April 8, July 7, 26, September 2, December 26,
1850, ibid.
25
 Pratt to Mason & Lawrence, February 18, 25, March 7, 26, April 1, 1850, ibid.
26
 Ibid., January 12, 21, February 26, 1850.
27
 Ibid., waste books, series on monthly wholesale value of total sales and of sales
effected in New York; series of commissions paid to the commission house for all sales
effected outside of Boston at a given rate of commission of % per cent. From this series
I have calculated the wholesale value of sales effected outside of Boston, the difference
between total sales and sales made outside Boston, and finally the ratio between Boston
sales and New York sales.
46 BUSINESS HISTORY REVIEW
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.2307/3112420
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 10 Jul 2017 at 16:17:47, subject to the
sion have paid for 71 per cent of his New York sales volume if
these sales had been made in Boston instead of New York? Average
selling costs should fall as sales volume grows, but it was easier to
sell the 71 per cent in Boston's narrow market than it was to sell
the 100 per cent in New York's wider market. Boston must have
been a more comfortable place for making sales at that time than
New York. It took quite a salesman to cover the rapidly changing
New York market, whereas long established contacts in Boston
made selling easier.28
It appears safe to say, then, that the amount of payments made
to salaried employees approximated the price of the selling service
as far as provided by the Boston office. Since commissions paid to
sub-agents covered a little bit more than just the selling service in
New York, total payments to sub-agents (column C) and to salaried
employees (column D) approximated rather closely the price for
the total selling service (column E).
Bookkeeping, the second of the basic services, was cheap. By the
middle of the century a bookkeeper earned a monthly salary of
$65.29 Only one-third of this salary fell to the Cocheco Manufactur-
ing Co., less than 10 per cent of the price of the selling service
proper.30 As to the provision of transportation service from the mill
to the wholesale markets, it was also cheap as long as it could be
left in the hands of a clerk with a salary in the neighborhood of
that of a bookkeeper. Certainly, transportation problems did not
rank among the crucial ones a commission house had to face.
Amory Lawrence, son of the senior partner of Lawrence & Co., used
to write his father lengthy reports on business matters without
ever mentioning transportation. But he was personally involved,
as a junior partner, even with the "freight details" until an effort
was made to relieve him from his task to which, it was said, "he
was given a good deal of attention of late at a greater expense of
time and money than he probably realizes." 31
We are here quoting a clerk's letter to the senior; a clerk wanted
to make sure that at least the boss "realized" what a burden he
was about to take over. We learn from the statement that the
clerks could handle freight problems by themselves if the firm so
desired. It was the clerks who wrote and signed letters on trans-
28
 As shown by the experiences of James Talcott. Hilliger, Talcott, passim.28
 Joseph B. Wheelock to Amos A. Lawrence, April 7, 1845, A. A. Lawrence Papers;
Elva Tooker, Nathan Trotter: Philadelphia Merchant, 1787-1853 (Cambridge, Mass., 1955),
63. 80
 The Cocheco Co. paid 33.8 per cent of the general expenses of the commission house
Mason & Lawrence from December 1, 1848 to November 30, 1851, Mason & Lawrence
Papers, ledgers B and C.31
 J. F. Dorsey to Amos A. Lawrence, Jan. 28, 1880, A. A. Lawrence Papers.
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portation questions from Faulkner, Page & Co. to N. Stevens &
Sons.32 Another 10 per cent of the price of the selling service would
thus amply cover the third of the basic services. We do not think
that elements of exploitatien were very significant and that the
true value of the basic services should thus be looked for in the
profits of the partners.
Table 1, column F compares payments to sub-agents and to sal-
aried employees (column E), which we have equated to the total
price of the selling service, with total payments by the mill for the
whole package of services provided by the commission house (col-
umn G). Payments to sub-agents and salaried employees were
never higher than 28 per cent of total payments up to the Civil
War. We shall refer to a possible change over time below. If the
combined price of the bookkeeping and transportation services was,
as suggested, not more than one-fifth of the price of the selling
service, the basic services provided by the commission house ac-
counted for only one-third of the amount of total payments from
mill to marketing agency. The other two-thirds, probably accruing
to the partners, remain to be explained.
THE VALUE OF Additional Services
There were three additional services provided by the commission
house to the mill whose impact on the costs, rents, and profits of the
commission house we shall now estimate: (1) giving some security
against credit losses of the mill through expert knowledge on the
credit standing of buyers (the credit service); (2) bringing about
financial aid (the -financial service); and (3) giving advice on the
choice of fabrics (the fabric-advisory service).
A good record of doing business safely, thanks to sound credit
judgment, was certainly important for the success of a commission
house. Although good credit service was a prerequisite for getting
any business at all, it is difficult to believe that, for our particular
type of business, it was a very distinguishing factor, one which
bound the mills to particular commission houses making for extra
profits, since good judgment was common to many houses. A dry
goods commission house dealt with a relatively small number of
buyers. Francis Skinner & Co. sold the product of the Pepperell
Manufacturing Co. to only 240 domestic customers from July 1851
to June 1852.33 Since the continued patronage of a mill partly de-
32
 Faulkner, Kimball & Co. (until July 1, 1871, then Faulkner, Page & Co.) to N.
Stevens & Co., 1867-1880, passim, Stevens Papers.
33
 Knowlton, Pepperell's Progress, 83.
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pended on it, a marketing agency specialized in dealing with these
buyers and was likely to become intimately involved with each of
them over time. Ability of buyers to pay in the past was good evi-
dence for their reliability in the near future. This evidence was
available to all houses of some experience, and there were many
such: thirty-seven out of seventy-four doing business in Boston by
1870 had been in business since at least 1850.34 Evidence of safe
credit standing going beyond a record of past achievements was
difficult to come by for anybody.
If credit service experience was crucial, newcomers must have
found it costly to come up to the common standard. Amos A. Law-
rence, upon entering business on his own in 1836, "travelled into
all the U. S. states with 2 business friends to examine credits."35
Such newcomers' costs granted established houses a rent. It is at
this point where the credit-rating agencies were likely to have then-
significance; institutions providing some information on credit stand-
ings increased following the establishment of Lewis Tappan's
Mercantile Agency in 1841.36 Although the degree of accuracy of
the ratings of these agencies is questionable, they were at least
able to tell their subscribers how long a potential buyer had been
in business without failure and to report changes in the personnel
of a firm; that is, they were able to convey a good part of the very
substance of an old firm's experience — knowledge of reliability of
buyers in the past — to anybody willing to pay their subscription
fee. Newcomers' costs of providing credit service must have approx-
imated the price of agency information; rents accruing to established
houses must have been excluded. And this price was relatively
small: originally $50 a year to firms with a trade volume above
$50,000 a year and $300 to those with a volume of more than
$500,000.
We do not believe, therefore, that credit information weighed
heavily in the price of a commission firm's services at the beginning
of our period, much less toward the end. The importance of credit
information decreased with the length of the credit period and,
hence, so did its price.37 Knowlton gives as the usual credit periods
34
 R. G. Dun & Co., credit reporting ledgers for Boston. Continuity in the history of a
commission house has been assumed if the style of its name remained unchanged, if the
senior partner did not change, if in case of retirement of the senior partner the former junior
partners continued to do business together.
35
 Miscellaneous letters, 1853—1887 and biographical notes on Amos A. Lawrence, A. A.
Lawrence Papers.
38
 For a sketch of the development of credit rating agencies see: Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,
The Centennial of the Birth of Impartial Credit Reporting: An American Idea (New York,
1941).
37
 Other things being equal. Credit risks may have increased with the territorial growth
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granted by Francis Skinner & Co. in selling cotton fabrics in differ-
ent years: eight months by 1855; after the panic of 1857 cash, four,
six, or eight months; six months by 1859; and thirty days during
and after the Civil War throughout our period.38 Faulkner, Kimball
& Co. sold its woolens by. 1870 on credit terms of thirty days for
the most part also. Out of a sample of 183 sales effected in Boston
and New York from January 1 to October 30, 1870, 7 per cent were
sold on credit terms of ten days, 56 per cent on thirty days, 26 per-
cent on sixty days, and 11 per cent on four months.39 Shorter credit
terms reduced the danger of unforeseeable developments in the
financial standing of a buyer.
A huge share in the price of the package of services provided
by a drygoods commission house still remains to be explained. We
think that at the beginning of our period the second additional
service, bringing about financial aid, could account for more than
half of the residual in some cases but for much less in the late
1870's. Cost factors — the price of the brokerage service involved
in financial aid —were negligible because there was no need for
contacting borrowers and the lenders were few and close at hand.
But financial service was, as long as only a limited number of com-
mission houses was able to provide it, important for two reasons.
It attracted business and, therefore, could increase profits on the
total package of services performed. It also yielded a substantial
rent.
By the middle of the century it was still true that "the chief
credit was with the selling house," not with the mill.40 The commis-
sion house was a better risk for outsiders than was the mill. By
interposing its own credit standing, the commission house was able
to raise money cheaper than the mill was able to do. Since the
commission house was so close to the financial operations of the
mill, it did not incur the risks of an outsider. If, therefore, the mill
paid the commission house the same rate of interest the former
would have had to pay to a note broker, then the commission
house earned a premium, a "profit on interest," proportional to the
difference between the credit standing of the mill (worse) and the
credit standing of commission house (better) in the market. If the
mill had only to pay the commission house what the latter paid in
of the market; is it not reasonable to expect that this increase was offset by the development
of the communication system?
38
 Knowlton, PeppereU's Progress, 90 t.38
 Faulkner, Kimball & Co. to N. Stevens & Co., Stevens Papers. For shortening of credit
periods in general, see Albert O. Greet, The Commercial Paper House in the United States
(Cambridge, Mass., 1938), 70.
40
 Copeland, Cotton Manufacturing, 197.
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the market, it was the mill who at first sight received a benefit. This
was the case if the commission house endorsed the mill's notes, thus
enabling the mill to discount the notes at a bank at the same rate
the commission house would have been granted. For this benefit
the mill may have recompensated the commission house in part
through higher commissions as long as competition among commis-
sion houses did not squeeze out such a recompensation. Here we
speak of an "interest element in commissions."
"Profit on interest" is empirically feasible. Mason & Lawrence
received 6 per cent interest for discounting the Cocheco Manufac-
turing Co.'s notes, a rate unchanged even in October and Novem-
ber 1857; clearly it was fixed at the level of the legal maximum.
The same rate appears later for other types of loans. From June 1,
1844 to November 30, 1852, Mason & Xawrence paid interest on
$70,168 employed in its business or invested in the mills on short
terms; in the same period they received interest payments on their
investments of $90,319. Even without taking into account that
some funds were held in non-interest-bearing employments, e.g., as
cash, the ratio between the interest rates paid and received was
78:100. If Mason & Lawrence got 6 per cent from the mills, it paid
not more than 4.7 per cent to their creditors — a figure which ap-
proximates a market rate. A very low proportion of the total inter-
est payments to commission-house creditors went to the partners;
most of them, 83 per cent in the period from December 1, 1850 to
May 31, 1851, went to banks, insurance companies, or other money
lenders.41
In contrast, the "interest element in commissions" can only be
inferred from differences in interest rates paid by mills of a given
credit standing, either to a commission house or to outsiders, and
under the assumption that some proportion of the mill's benefit went
to the commission house. Given the fact that commission houses
apparently charged the maximum legal interest rate, and given the
high interest rates in the streets for second-class paper, substantial
"interest elements in commissions" are at least very plausible.42
But in the 1870's "interest elements in commissions" were likely
to decrease for three reasons: the mills required less money; they
had improved their credit standing; and the commission houses, in
an easy money market, were competing for investment opportu-
nities. We referred to the fact that credit periods became shorter
"Cash books B and C, passim, waste book B, May 31, 1870 (interest of 6 per cent
on unspecified loan), ledger C (interest account)., Mason & Lawrence Papers. No individual
rates for interest paid to creditors appear on the books.
42
 Joseph G. Martin, Martin's Boston Stock Market: Eighty-Eight Years (Boston, 1886),
"Monthly Reports on Money Market," 44 ff.
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TABLE 2
DISCOUNTS ON COMMERCIAL PAPER
PAID BY BOSTON COMMISSION HOUSES AND A TEXTDLE
MANUFACTURING FmM, 1875-1879
Finn
Allen, Lane & Co.
Barnes, Ward & Co.
Dale Bros. & Co.
Danforth, Clark &
Co.
Denny, Poor & Co.
Dexter, Abbot & Co.
Faulkner, Page
& Co.
Floyd Bros. & Co.
Frost & Co.
Gowing & Grew
Harding Bros. & Co.
Harding, Colby & Co
Holbrook & Co.
Joy, Langdon & Co.
Kelly, Thomas &
Co.
Leland, Allen &
Bates
Mackintosh, Green
& Co.
Minot, Hooper & Co.
Mudge, Sawyer &
Co.
Perry, Wendell, Fay
& Co.
Richardson &
Whitney
Richardson & Co.
Upham, Tucker &
Co.
Wentworth & Co.
Whittemore, Cabot &
Co.
Wright, Bliss &
Fabyan
1875 •
Apr.
26
6
7J4
7
em
—
534
—
—
—
5J4
—
. 534
5
534
—
6
534/6
—
—
5
12
5/534
—
—
7K/8
5/534
Lawrence Manufacturing
Co. 7
Nov. J
10
,
7/734
—
—
—
—
—
—
6/634
—
534
5/5)4
—
6
—
—
—
— • ,
—
—
—
7/734
—
434/6
1876
\pr.
24
—
—
—
—
—
434
—
—
—
—
—
4
4
—
—
4
—
—
—
—
Nov.
20
—
4
—
434
434
4
5
434
4
434
12
334/4
—
—
334/4
—
—
4
—
634/7
334/4
334
1877
Apr. —
23
434/5 —
3/4 —
4 —
— —
— —
5 —
— —
5 —
— —
— —
434 —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
4 —
— —
— —
4 —
1878 :
- Oct.
- 1
__
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— 4/4K
— —
— 10/12
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— 6/6K
— —
— 4/4K
1879
Feb.
26
_
3/3X
3/354
—
3/3K
3/334
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
3
—
—
—
3/3)4
—
—
For notes, see Appendix.
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over time, hence credit requirements of mills also decreased. Inter-
est rates paid by mills and by commission houses to outsiders ap-
proached each other. R. G. Dun & Co. gives at certain dates during
the years 1875 to 1879 the discount rates usually paid by a number
of Boston commission houses on their paper or on mill paper en-
dorsed by them.43 Table 2 shows these rates and compares them
with rates paid on unendorsed mill paper.44 We find that the
latter ranged among those paid by the very best commission houses.
Much casual evidence for considerable liquidity of commission
houses and readiness to assume financial responsibility is available:
Mackintosh, Green & Horton were said to have "what capital they
can use to advantage;" Dexter, Abbot & Co. had "ample means for
handling" its accounts; Faulkner, Page & Co. found it difficult to
employ all its money. Several firms were reported by R. G. Dun
& Co. to buy paper apart from what they took from the mills.45
Where a large house carried more mills than it easily could supply
with funds, it could tap outside resources.46 What it meant to have
outside money available is illustrated by Amory A. Lawrence cau-
tioning his father against accepting a banker's money: 4T
Don't think we are short of money and must have a large deposit from
some one or a line of an outside bank (Beat's for example) for we are not,
and if we should borrow, we had better use our own banks, as we shall
want but for a few months, and we have not had a loan at any of them for
a long time. If you should happen to whisper to Beat that you thought
perhaps some time you might want some money he will bother you until
you take of him.
Although uncertain as to what portion of the total price of all
services the fabric-advisory service represented at the beginning of
our period, we can now say that it accounted for a large portion in
the 1870's unless either the total price of all services declined over
time or the price of the basic services increased.
Casual observation of the movement of commission rates does not
suggest a decrease.48 The rates of commission do not, however, say
very much about the actual price paid for the services for two rea-
sons. First, the commission payments were obviously less than total
43
 R. G. Dun & Co., credit reporting ledgers for Boston.
""Rates paid by Lawrence Manufacturing Company according to entries in Notes and
Bills payable, 1874-1908." This single bill book is among the Mason & Lawrence Papers,
vol. 112.
«Dun & Co., Boston: 3.477(72), 1-3-76. (Mackintosh, Green & Horton); 1.500
z/29(68), 9-7-83 (Dexter, Abbot & Co.); 2.599 a/100(69), 9-26-79 (Faulkner, Page &
Co.); 1.265(68) 11-1-77 (Parker, Wilder & Co.)j 15.495(84) 11-1-77 (Wendell,
Hutchinson & Co.); 4.352(73), 11-20-69, 5-1-71, 6-26-73 (White, Brown & Co.).
"Dun & Co., Boston: 16.3(85), 7-2-77 (J.'S. & E. Wright & Co.).
47
 Amory A. Lawrence to Amos A. Lawrence, 1877, July 3, 1877, A. A. Lawrence Papers.
•"Hunger, Talcott, 92; Ewing and Norton, Broadlooms, 83, 94, 141.
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selling costs, and part of these costs was charged to the mill in addi-
tion to commissions. Just what the commissions were meant to cover
was a matter of agreement between the mill and the commission
house. Second, even where the type of such an agreement is known,
its economic significance still depends upon the internal structure
of the commission house. For example, while an agreement may tell
us that commissions should exclusively cover the earnings of part-
ners' net of employees' salaries, it does not tell us whether the
partners left most of the work to be done to salaried employees or
whether new partners were admitted and paid by a share in profits
out of commissions.
In order to be on safer ground we turn again to the actual pay-
ments of the Cocheco Manufacturing Co. to Lawrence & Co. Adding
the figures for commissions to sub-agents (Table 1, column C), the
salaries of employees (column D), and the commissions paid to
partners (column A), we sum the total monthly payments on
commissions and salaries (column G). The last are then related
(column J) to the gross wholesale value of sales (column H).
This ratio (column H), between total payments on commissions
and salaries and the monthly wholesale value of sales, is considered
as the actual price for the package of selling services provided by
the selling house. Our series for this price from 1849 to 1883 is
not necessarily representative of a general price movement. Short-
run fluctuations and sudden shifts in the price level, like that from
1869 to 1870-1871, can be attributed to particular qualities of the
two individual firms. The package of services provided by Lawrence
& Co. may have changed over time in an unrepresentative way and
hence affected its price. But if we hesitate to take this particular
price series as being representative of a general trend, we can at
least say that the general trend as reflected in casual quotations of
formal commission rates is confirmed in the one case for which we
have solid data: the actual price paid by the Cocheco Manufacturing
Co. for the services provided by the commission house was as high
in the 1870's as it was in the 1850's.
We take for granted that the transportation service and the book-
keeping service did not assume a greater share in the total price
of all services at the end than at the beginning of our period. As
to the price of the selling service, it might well have increased with
the beginnings of more aggressive selling.49 We were not able to
associate the earnings of an individual salesman with as clearly
19
 Increasing importance of traveling agents may have affected selling costs. But it was
the jobbers who mainly employed the commercial travelers in our period. Cole, American
Wool Manufacture, 292; Ewing and Norton, Broadlooms, 84, 94, 136, 152.
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identified a bundle of services in the 1870's as we were in the 1850's.
The only later evidence we have for the earnings of sub-agents, who
supposedly were predominantly engaged in bringing about contact
with buyers, is taken from rather impressionistic reports of R. G.
Dun & Co. Taken as a whole, the reports convey the idea of only
a limited financial success among sub-agents: Woodbury & Foss
were reported by 1881 to "make a living" without accumulating;
and by 1885 to "barely make a living;" C. S. Bartlett & Co. cleared
$3,000 in commissions in 1876 and were said to "make a good liv-
ing;" Maxwell Lowry was "doing a good commission business" by
1875, but eight years later R. G. Dun & Co. found that it "must be
close work for him to make a living;" C. J. Davis by 1886 was mak-
ing "Just about . . . a living."50
Of course, "to make a living" was a phrase indiscriminately em-
ployed by reporters who knew nothing specific. But we learn some-
thing about the general image associated in the mind of the reporter
with sub-agents as a group; a dramatic rise in sub-agents' earnings
would have affected this image somehow. And nothing short of
a dramatic rise would have made the selling service account for
more than one-half of the price of the entire package of services.
THE VALUE OF THE Fabric-Advisory Service
The ability of a commission house to give advice on the choice
of fabrics naturally took many forms, and shades in the quality of
advice led to a close affiliation of some houses with certain mills.
Unlike financial aid or credit information, advice on the choice of
fabrics was not easily standardized. It took specialized experience,
well-established channels of information, and an individual capable
of integrating this information into a vision of coming developments.
A house of old standing in a particular field, with the right man at
the right place, could offer advantages to a mill not quickly matched
by other houses.
If a house thus found itself in a sheltered position, monopolistic
profits were likely to persist over time. These profits are hardly
measurable except as a residual, that is, with all the difficulties in-
volved before. What may be determinable is the price a commission
house had to pay on the special skill of formulating and shaping the
advice if the advice was furnished by a particular individual, a
»>Dun & Co., Boston: 12.427(71), 7-11-31, 3-26-85 (Woodbury & Foss); 15.176
(84), 11-20-76 (Bartlett & Co.); 2.848(70), 1H0-75, 2.941(70), 2-16-83 (Lowry);
9.428(78), 3-18-86 (Davis).
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"prophet of fashion."61 If such an individual could be identified
and his earnings unambiguously associated with this special skill,
one would get a lower limit for the value of the fabric-advisory
service, a figure for the cost, element included in the price of the
service. • •
Of course, one would like to avoid the pitfalls involved in look-
ing at the distribution of the net earnings of a commission house
among its partners and in taking the share of each partner as a
competitive market price for his personal services. A share could
include profit and rent elements; it was fixed by agreement hardly
responding to changes in a partner's achievements; social considera-
tions and family relationships may have had a greater influence on it
than economic factors. In only one situation of the history of Law-
rence & Co. does a share in earnings seem to reflect the economic
significance of the specific function fulfilled by a partner. This
moment of truth came with the admission of a former employee of
a distant firm, a man without means who was not a social peer of the
older partners, and with an unusually high reward for his future
contributions to the firm's success. Let us see how this situation
came about and what it meant.
In 1865, Lawrence & Co. took over a new account and started
selling for the recently incorporated Arlington Woolen Mills, later
Arlington Mills. The Arlington Woolen Mills started out produc-
ing woolen fancy shirtings, flannels, and felted goods. After 1866,
it went into worsted and cotton-warp dressgoods. Selling terms in
the mid-1870's granted the commission house a commission of 2Vfe
per cent on the sales proceeds and full reimbursements for expendi-
tures on freight, cartage, labels, telegrams, and insurance. Yearly
commissions of $25,000 on a sales volume of $1,000,000 were thus
to cover general commission house expenses like store rent, to the
amount of $9,500, and the $8,000 paid out as salaries to two em-
ployees dealing with Arlington fabrics. This left a profit of $7,500
to the partners.52
We are informed on the functions fulfilled by the salaried em-
ployees working on Arlington goods by two statements. The first
is a letter of recommendation of 1871 introducing Webster, one of
the employees in question, and saying: "I doubt if anyone in this
country knows so much about all descriptions of worsted goods as
n Berger, Pacific Mills, 15.52
 E. Everton Foster (ed.). Lamb's Textile Industries of the United States (2 vols.,
Boston, 1916), I, 445; "Memo of an agreement between Messrs. Lawrence & Co. & the
Arlington Woolen Mills, Sept. 1, 1874," statement on financial affairs of Arlington Mills,
March 16, 1875, A. A. Lawrence Papers.
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him . . . I do not know of anyone, so far as I can judge, who would
be more capable to superintend the manufacture of worsted goods,
order styles, and make sales, than him." Obviously, Webster was
expected, in addition to making sales, to watch the market and
guide production. The second statement concerns the other em-
ployee, M. H. Dorman, who, by 1873, was complaining about having
too little "influence on the management of the production."53 He,
too, apparently formerly had a say in preparing the goods. Thus,
the salaried employees attended to problems of styles and produc-
tion decisions and received part of their salary for doing so.
In sharp contrast to their role in the administration of the Cocheco
Manufacturing Co. the partners apparently did not interfere with
production problems of the Arlington Woolen Mills. For one thing,
they all were not acquainted with the specific problems of woolen
manufacture and had to leave the new problems to new employees.
Also, the mill was ably managed by its treasurer, William Whitman,
who held office with rare success from 1867 to 1902. There was, thus,
no need for the kind of entrepreneurial leadership Amos A. Law-
rence was capable of offering. But the mill needed money, and
supplying it with financial aid appears to be sufficient explanation,
in the first stage of the development of the mill, for the commission-
house partners' earnings. The financial foundation of the Arlington
Woolen Mills was very weak. As late as 1875, the paid-in capital
amounted to $200,000 and accumulated profits to $258,000, a guar-
antee reserve for prospective losses on sales included. These funds
hardly covered the fixed assets: the book value of real estate, build-
ings, machinery, and so on amounting to $439,000. The entire
working capital of $500,000 had to be provided by outside parties;
to a large extent by the commission house.54
In the late 1870's the relative importance of the services per-
formed by the selling house to the mill changed, and by 1882 the
change became feasible in terms of profit distribution. We have
referred to the increasing availability of short-run funds in the
1870's. At the same time, the Arlington Woolen Mills increased its
capital stock to $500,000 in 1877 and $750,000 in 1880. A series of
spectacular dividend payments, compared with what was usual in
the textile industry at the time, of 10 per cent yearly from 1878
to 1881 also improved the mill's credit standing. In fact, by 1879
Arlington's treasurer refused to sell his paper to Lawrence & Co.
53
 G. Brewer to Amos A. Lawrence, June 26, 1871, M. H. Dorman to Amos A. Lawrence,
January 21, 1873, A. A. Lawrence Papers.51
 Statement of the condition of the Arlington Mills, November 30, 1875, ibid.
WHAT PRICE STYLE? 57
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.2307/3112420
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 10 Jul 2017 at 16:17:47, subject to the
at a discount rate of 4 per cent "saying he could do better on the
street."55
In April 1881, then, the mill must have felt independent enough
to raise some problems with the commission house and to suggest
solutions which, at first sight, seemed to aim at breaking up the
relations between Arlington and Lawrence & Co.56 What was at
stake was the ability of the commission house to perform the fabric-
advisory service. This ability was challenged by Whitman in a
memorandum of May 9, 1881; at the same time the need for advice
was made clear: 5T
The machinery now at the mill enables me not only to obtain a larger
product, but to vary it to meet the constantly changing preferences of
customers. The prospective demands of our business indicate the necessity
for greater variety of product — smaller quantities of each — higher quality
of texture — the exercise of taste and knowledge of the wants of buyers,
to a greater degree than heretofore.
I cannot manage this to the best advantage without skilled and intelligent
aid. Prominent amongst these requirements is to have persons quick to
appreciate any indications of a coming change, either in sorts or colors of
the goods, and to suggest the most promising to be made for the immediate
future. Such persons can only obtain the requisite skill and knowledge by
constant intercourse with buyers and by possessing their confidence. The
aid that I require is that of the practical goods merchant. I do not need
. . . manufacturing knowledge, but commercial sagacity to guide us to the
probable needs of the market, and to sell the goods . . . Now, neither in
Boston nor in New York have I the aid that I require, i.e., such a person
as I have already described to handle the goods, and be responsible for
doing so . . . New York, our largest outlet for goods, needs, I think, im-
mediate care.
Having given this perceptive description of the service he expected
his selling house to perform, the mill's treasurer pointed to the
man he wanted placed in charge of the selling job in New York:
Alfred Ray, hitherto employed in Chicago by Marshall Field & Co.58
Ray soon became a partner of Lawrence & Co., responsible for
"the control of the Arlington, absolute control . . . Prices and
style" — so agreed the partners — "we should be second." 59 If there
is any doubt left as to whether Ray was primarily expected, in terms
of the treasurer, to "sell the goods" or "to guide us to the probable
needs of the market," we find evidence for the dominance of the
latter function: Ray had not been a salesman or a sales manager
with Marshall Field & Co. but purchasing manager of the dress
K
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goods department.60 In that capacity he had become expert in
judging demand rather than in making buyers buy.
What did Lawrence & Co. pay for the services of the new man?
Ray asked for a yearly salary of $20,000. He was guaranteed this
amount and promised, in addition, one-quarter of the increase of
profits of 1883 and 1884 over the profits of 1882. His actual share
in profits for the first eleven months (January 1-November 30,
1882) amounted to $18,333 and to $24,000 for the first full year.
Profits from commissions increased after Ray had joined the firm.
But of course the older partners' share in these profits declined.
They were credited with $12,000 in 1879; $9,000 in 1880; and $14,000
in 1881. The new arrangement left them with $6,000 in 1882 and
with $7,000 in 1883: their earnings from the Arlington Woolen
Mills were roughly cut in half.61 -Increase in relative importance
of a particular kind of human skill had forced them to transfer
profits to the scarce factor, unless they were prepared to quit the
Arlington business which they no longer were able to keep through
financial ties.
CONCLUSIONS
The general hypothesis and model suggested that much money
was paid by the mills for the fabric-advisory service of the commis-
sion houses — perhaps even one-half of the cost of the latter's whole
package. The case approach shows that in a particular situation
a member of a commission house was paid an extremely high salary
(and profit-sharing) for providing that service; indeed, his salary
was three times that of the recompensation earned by the mill's top
manager, its treasurer.
The strong position of the commission house in the woolen and
cotton industries was not just a residual of mercantile capitalism.
The characteristics of product innovation in our period and in our
industry — continuous adjustment of production to a flow of infor-
mation on short-run changes of the market —tied up important
entrepreneurial activities with an agency close to the market. Not
much more was left at the mill in many cases than the trade-school
type of technical management in "command of the intricacies of
textile production" as characterized by Navin.62 And the character-
M Dun & Co., New York City: 3.1283(221), 1-5-82; Chicago: 18.255(44), 11-29-78.
"Lawrence & Co., to Alfred Ray, July 20, 1881, A. A. Lawrence Papers; waste book,
Mason & Lawrence Papers.
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istics of entrepreneurial activity only reflected the basic task with
which the industries were confronted: adjustment of a technically
mature apparatus to the growing sophistication of a society able to
pay for more than the basic-needs. Thus, the marketing man ap-
pears as the true leader in a process of permanent open-ended
change, competitive pressure on his back and profits before him
as a reward for a creative idea; profits for the mills, to be sure, but
he would get the benefit from them.
APPENDIX TO TABLES
The figures of Table 1 are calculated on the basis of entries in the waste
books of Mason & Lawrence (later Lawrence & Co.). Column H gives for
each commercial year (December 1-November 30) the average of the
monthly gross wholesale values of sales of Cocheco prints effected by the
commission house. Column A gives for each year the average of monthly
commissions paid by the commission house to the mill; these figures are
calculated as percentages of the gross wholesale value of sales in column
H on the basis of the formal commission rate. The formal commission
rate was 1% per cent until May 31, 1849, VA per cent from June 30, 1849,
to May 31, 1870, 1% per cent after June 1, 1870. Until September 30,
1858, the mill paid additional commissions of & per cent on sales effected
outside of Boston to the commission house. For each year the average of
monthly additional commissions has been included in Column A.
Column C shows for each year the average of monthly commissions
paid by the mill to the sub-agent in New York from 1849 to May 31,1859,
and after June 1, 1859, the share of the Cocheco Manufacturing Co. as
actually fixed by the commission house in the salary of an employee of
the commission house in New York. Column D gives the share of the
Cocheco Manufacturing Co. in salaries paid to employees of the com-
mission house in Boston. Salaries of employees were charged according
to the accounting system of the commission house to a general expense
account and the mill accounts were charged for a share in general ex-
penses. On the assumption that each mill's share in general expenses
went in equal proportions on the different expense items, we calculated
that percentage of general expenses charged to the Cocheco Manufactur-
ing Co. which was paid out as salaries to employees, for four two-year
periods: December 1, 1849 to November 30, 1851, 1859/61, 1869/71,
1879/81. This percentage figure was quite stable, 53 per cent on the
average for the first, and 47 per cent, 47 per cent, and 56 per cent for
the other three two-year periods. For each year we took that percentage
figure as the basis for the calculation of the payments of the Cocheco
Manufacturing Co. on salaries which comes closest chronologically to the
particular year. The average monthly value of the share of the Cocheco
Manufacturing Co. in total general expenses for each year was calculated
as a moving average of the values for May and November of three years.
Table 2 is derived from B. G. Dun & Co.'s credit rating ledgers for
Boston. The reports describe the negotiable instruments in question
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simply as "paper" in most cases and occasionally as "acceptances" or
"endorsements" without specifying their particular character. This paper
may have included the following four types: single-name promissory notes
issued by the commission house; two-name promissory notes issued by the
manufacturing firm and endorsed by the commission house; trade bills
used by customers for payment and endorsed by the commission house;
drafts drawn by the commission house on buyers. These four types are
lumped together under the heading of "commercial paper." This term
used here does not imply that the paper was only sold in die street; it may
have been sold also to banks.
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